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Summary 
This paper applies to adverse selection theory the advances made in the field of 
ambiguity theory. It shows that i) a relevant second-best contract induces no production 
distortion considering the efficient agent as in the standard case. But the principal has to  pay 
a higher information rent compared to the standard case; ii) This is due to the level of 
transfer paid to the inefficient agent which is higher than under the complete information 
system. The above results are reached when the agent has neither fully optimistic nor 
optimistic beliefs. When, he feels an extreme feeling then, the information rent and second 
best transfers are inside bounds similar to the SEU case; iv) as a consequence, the principal 
has to adopt a flexible behavior consisting in acquiring new information for becoming either 
entirely optimistic or pessimistic to minimize transfers and information rent in the proposed 
delegation contract.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
.  
The present paper aims at applying to classic adverse selection theory recent 
progresses made by ambiguity theory 1 . Ambiguous choices appear when agents face 
situations characterized by “unmeasurable uncertainties” 2  following Frank Knight, i.e. 
uncertain events that no probability distribution can predict. 
Adverse selection arises when a principal considers farming out a charge to an agent. 
Benefiting from increasing returns (division of work) or performing efficiently several tasks 
may motivate the delegation choice. This applies to all varieties of contractual relationships 
between two entities (corporate and workers, public utilities and firms, etc.). This process 
generates information asymmetries because the agents can easily hide private information 
from the principal (true ability, cost structure technologies, knowledge, etc.). However, an 
efficient use of economic resources involves restoring information symmetry between all 
parties and, the principal must design some incentive schemes to reach this goal. In classical 
adverse selection models, this involves allocating rent information to most proficient agents, 
and then inducing them to provide the first-best level of services (Laffont and Martimort 
(2002)).  
To study the consequences of introducing “unmeasurable uncertainty” in the adverse 
selection scheme, we use the simplest formulation of Laffont and Martimort (2002), i.e. their 
one-shot adverse-selection model This is a contractual framework characterized by no-
repetition, no-adjustment process. Hence, this paper’s main goal is characterizing the 
information rent extraction process under “true” uncertainty.  
With the standard view, both principal and agent are rational and they maximize a 
Savage Expected Utility function (SEU). In its simplest version, the model considers that the 
agent is either efficient or inefficient and the principal ignores which kind of agent he meets. 
However, by assumption, the proportion between efficient and inefficient agent is common 
knowledge. Considering “real” uncertainty involves that a unique probability distribution 
cannot summarize the principal’s beliefs. This view comes from Ellsberg (1961) who showed 
that Savage’s axioms lead to paradoxical choices3. In our model, the principal forms beliefs 
                                                          
1
 The references about these advances are presented in the following of the introduction and in section 1 and 
appendix 1.  
2 Following the Frank Knight’s terminology (in Knight (1921)). 
3
 See Teitelbaum (2007) for a review of the following literature. 
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about the probability distribution of the states of nature. The principal’s objective function is a 
specific Choquet integral i.e. a“neo-additive capacity” as described by Chateauneuf 
Eichberger and Grant (2007), or still, Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2005). This objective 
function is the weighted sum of the maximum value, the minimum one and the average value 
that the principal can expect from his transaction with the agent and this function replaces the 
standard SEU.  
Under information asymmetry, the principal cannot directly enforce the first best 
contracts. To deter the efficient agent to mimic the inefficient one and to grasp some higher 
level of transfer against some low quality services, the principal accepts to pay him an 
informational rent. This is a second-best contract that induces the efficient agent to supply his 
first-best service. Substituting neo-capacity to standard SEU comes from the fact that the 
principal faces ambiguous beliefs and may feel either optimism or pessimism about the 
agent’s efficiency. The paper shows then:  
- First, considering agent’s efficiency, a relevant second-best contract creates no 
production distortion likewise the standard case. However, unlike this case, the 
information rent to pay is much higher.   
- Second, paradoxically, concerning the inefficient agent, the information rent due to 
transfers is higher than the first-best situation.  
- Third, when the agent feels an extreme feeling (fully optimistic or pessimistic) 
then, the information rent and second best transfers lie inside bounds similar to the 
SEU case.  
- Fourth, from the above results lead to consider that the principal has to adopt a 
flexible behavior that consists in acquiring of new information before choosing the 
contract terms. The aim is to become either fully optimistic or pessimistic and 
minimize both transfers (and information rent). Hence, introducing uncertainty and 
a neo-additive capacity as a utility function involves that the principal takes into 
account the opportunity costs associated with potentially irreversible choices.  
Obviously, applying ambiguity for adverse selection is not that new. For instance, 
Wakker, Timmermans and Machielse (2007) analyze empirically insurance theory. They test 
how weary are agents about ambiguity. In a more theoretical dissertation, Martinez-Correa 
(2012) tests the impact of ambiguity on Borch-Arrow insurance markets. He shows that the 
level of coinsurance under ambiguity, compared to risk only, will depend on the relative 
importance of risk and ambiguity for each party.  The differences in beliefs correspond to the 
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ratios of the risk aversion on the ambiguity aversion parameters. These works are rather far 
from our purpose. 
In a first part, we remind the theoretical background involved by the using of 
neoadditive capacities compared to standard capacities. In a second part, we describe the set 
of allocations that the principal can attain in spite of the lack of information he undergoes. He 
has to induce the agents to reveal their true nature by defining a set of incentive compatibility 
constraints and participation constraints. Then, in a third part, we introduce neo-additive 
capacities in the Principal’s program. In a fourth part, we sketch the features of the 
informational belief system corresponding to the acquisition of new information. A fifth part 
concludes.  
II. Background 
For the last sixty years, the subjective Savage expected utility theory (SEU) (Savage 
(1954)) ruled the field of uncertainty theory. SEU combines de Finetti’s (1937) calculus of 
subjective probability and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)’s expected utility theory. 
Since its early formulation, this leadership empirical and theoretical works questioned this 
leadership (Allais (1952)). The critics focus on the violations of the SEU main rationality 
axioms. In SEU, the decision makers have personal probabilities defined on several uncertain 
states of nature. They express preferences on these states and the SEU axioms show under 
which conditions is represented a numerical expected utility. From their choices are inferred 
subjective probabilities.  
In the early sixties, Ellsberg (1961) revitalized the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (probabilities unknown) made by Keynes and Knight at the beginning of the XXth 
century. Ellsberg analyses the behavior of individuals who have to make similar choices 
facing two situations. In situation (A), an agent makes a choice among an alternative. Both 
events can occur under a known probability distribution. In situation B, the alternative is the 
same but the probability distribution is unknown. Most of the time, the agents prefer to make 
their choice in situation (A) where the probability distribution is given rather than in (B). This 
situation violates the sure-thing principle of the SEU. Indeed, implicitly, even ignoring the 
true probability of the alternative in B, by choosing in situation A, the agent does “as” if the 
chance of success in B were lesser than in A. Ellsberg explains this by the agents’ aversion for 
ambiguity. The following example shows more precisely the point. 
Let us assume that a manager (principal) has the opportunity to hire the services of an 
agent in a location A. A priori, he does not know whether the worker is skilled enough or not. 
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If this last one is qualified his payoff will be  , if not, he will gain  , (    ,          . 
The principal knows only the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the A area. Let 
respectively be   and               this proportion. In a different location (B), he 
has the opportunity to earn the same amounts       , but, the proportion      between skilled 
and inexperienced workers       is unknown. Hence, the expectation of gain for location A 
is                   and for location B:  
E                   .  
If the principal chooses A rather than B, that means that he thinks that              , or still:                          or,                     
And, naturally:     . 
Hence, by choosing A, implicitly, the principal allocates a lower probability to the 
meeting of a skilled worker in B and he has expressed his aversion for ambiguous situation.  
Ellsberg (1961) shows that the usual distribution probabilities cannot represent beliefs: 
the agents do not use probability in a linear manner, as does it the expected utility model. 
Ellsberg’s paradox highlights the non-additivity of "subjective probability" (or "beliefs") 
attributed to complementary events. The agents' preferences do not respect the principles of 
the Savage theory of uncertainty (pre-order principle and the sure-thing principle). Schmeidler 
considers this as the "first principle of bayesianism" i.e. the representation of uncertainty by a 
single measure of additive probability (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989)). 
Schmeidler used Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU), which involves representing 
individuals’ beliefs with non-additive probabilities (or capacities). Following this approach, 
individuals maximize the expected value of a utility function with respect to a non-additive 
belief. Mathematically, this corresponds to a Choquet integral. 
The Ellsberg’s paradox also gave rise to empirical experiments. Laboratory tests 
showed no proportional relationships but distortions between losses and gains in the mind of 
people. In those years, the literature about uncertainty hugely grew. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) 
attempted to bring together theoretical and empirical studies to define the effective 
individuals’ behavior facing uncertainty. Kahneman, and Tversky (1979), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986) and 1992) or still Tversky and Fox (1995) or Tversky and Wakker (1995), 
Prelec (1998) deeply inspired their studies. They try to understand how individuals distort 
outcomes and probabilities. Hence, the agents systematically tend to overweight low 
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probabilities and underweight high ones. A trend of theoretical works systematized these 
empirical approaches and simplified Schmeidler’s advances. Hence, Eichberger, Kelsey and 
Schipper (2005) noted that the general CEU model applies hardly because of intrinsic 
mathematical complexity and a high number of free parameters. For instance, a capacity on a 
set with n elements involves   parameters, while (n-1) parameters describe a probability 
distribution on the same set. Consequently, Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007) and 
Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2005) develop the concept of neoadditive capacity. 
Neoadditive capacity is a probability weighting function and “Neo” is the abbreviation for 
Non-Extremal Outcome additive. This approach helps to assimilate the contribution 
associated to the inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function (Gonzalez and Wu (1999). 
Indeed, under Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity, a weighted sum of the 
minimum utility, the maximum utility, and the expected utility represent an agent’s 
preferences. This relationship links together experimental analysis and theoretical approaches. 
Concretely, the choice of a concrete act    that yields uncertain outcomes represents his 
preferences:                                  
Where      represents the maximum value of the act   and      its minimum,       the expected value. The parameters   and   express respectively the level of optimism 
and the degree of belief of the agent in the expected value of  . For instance consider that if    , the agent will assess his preferences by the expected value of   and the maximum 
value:                         
Hence,   measures the decision-maker’s level of optimism while   expresses his 
pessimism degree4 . So the agent will over-weight good and bad outcomes compared to 
expected utility theory. When considering neo-additive-capacities, only the best and worst 
outcomes are over-weighted. In appendix one, we provide a simplified version of these 
developments.  
III. The basic framework 
Now, we consider a principal (regulator) that delegates to an agent the production of   
positive units of a good. Its value is      where: 
-         , (increasing in  ), and negative or null in the second derivative         .  
Thus,      is concave with       . As usual in model in this kind, there are no fixed 
                                                          
4
 See Teitelbaum (2007) 
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costs and for payment for the supply of     , the agent receives an amount   (transfer). 
The agent’s production costs are assumed unobservable from the principal, but, it is 
common knowledge that the marginal costs can take values in the following interval: 
- Ψ       with        and          . The index   shows an efficient agent ( -
Agent) while the   index corresponds to an inefficient one ( -Agent). It is assumed that 
the Principal meets the efficient  -Agent with a probability of   and the inefficient  -
Agent with a probability    . The cost function that is assumed linear in  : 
-           with a probability    or,      (1) 
-           with a probability    .     (   
The linearity of cost will be our working assumption. 
1. The contracting sets under complete and incomplete information 
Here, basically, a contract is an agreement by which the agent engages to supply a 
certain amount of goods or services to the principal in exchange for a payment (transfer). Let   be the set of feasible contractual allocations where:                          (3) 
A third party can observe and verify these variables (generally, authors refer to a court 
of law or a specialized agency).  
The usual asymmetric information framework assumes that the agent discovers his 
type, and then the Principal offers a contract that the agent can either accept or reject. Once 
accepted, the principal enforces the contract. This is the timing of the contractual relationship.  
The complete Information Optimal Contract 
The complete information between the principal and the agent model constitutes the 
benchmark of this agency relationship. From the first order conditions of the social welfare 
function      , (                     ,    ) the production levels define as: 
- For an efficient agent:                      (4) 
- For an inefficient one:                       (5) 
Depending on the agent’s nature (efficient or not), under a complete information 
regime, the production level will be either    or   , for non negative social functions: 
 
                        or                          
The condition that the social value of production achieved with an efficient agent is 
always higher than an inefficient one, i.e. : 
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                                   (6) 
This is a direct result of     . 
An important issue in what follows is that      , i.e. the optimal production of the 
efficient agent is greater than the one of the inefficient agent. This, because the principal’s 
marginal value of output is decreasing. Implementing the first best production levels entails 
for the principal to make a take-it-or leave-it offer to the agent which involves a zero profit 
opportunity. Afterward, the efficient contracts under asymmetric information write as                                 will have to meet the participation constraints:               (7)                (8) 
(with equality respected for an optimal contract).  
Constraints (7) and (8) are called the “ agent’s participation constraints” and mean that 
the principal has to supply that level of transfer which insures to the agent a utility level at 
least as high as the agent could obtain without doing anything. Hence an optimal contract 
under complete information involves that         and       . 
The asymmetric information case 
We assume now that the efficiency type of the agent         is private information. 
It is well known that the set of efficient contracts      defined under complete information 
cannot be implemented because the efficient type could simulate the behavior of the 
inefficient one and, when profitable, to get an informational rent         . Consequently, 
the efficient allocation set under asymmetric information      has to satisfy the following 
incentive compatibility constraints:                  (9)                  (10) 
The condition for accepting a menu is to fulfill the following participation constraints:               (11)               (12)    
Asymmetric information adds more constraints on the allocation of resources and a 
menu of contract is incentive feasible if it satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints (9) 
and (10) and the participation ones (11) and (12). When adding (9) and (10) we get  
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                       and                  and 
                   and, naturally:            (13) 
This well-known result will be useful in the following. Relationship (13) is an 
enforcement condition. Under complete information, the information rent level is null. 
Consequently, if respectively,   and   are the efficient and the inefficient agents’ utility 
level, then,               and            . Therefore, the agents cannot 
benefit from extra-rents extracted under asymmetric information. This is no longer the case 
under asymmetric information. The efficient agent will get the following utility level when he 
decides to mimic the inefficient one: 
                             (14) 
This relationship means that the information rent is carried out by the informational 
gain of the agent over the principal. Each category of agent can get the following information 
rent:               (15)               (16) 
These writings (15) and (16) will be used in the following of the argument.  
2. The Principal’s choice under ambiguity 
We consider now that the principal has beliefs represented by neo-capacities as 
defined above in the background of the study. Neo-capacities play a similar role to a 
subjective probability in the expected theory of utility.   
The Choquet utility expectation function of the principal  
Coming back to considerations about uncertainty, we define the utility function of the 
principal as a Choquet expected utility. This utility writes as the weighted sum of the 
maximum utility, the minimum utility, and the expected utility:                                  
Appendix 1 recalls the conditions that lead to build neo-additive capacities and 
adapted Choquet integrals. To apply this to our model, we have to consider the space of states 
        to which is associated the skills of the agents Consequently, under asymmetric 
information the outcome space will be: 
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                Then, in what follows (by abuse),                                        (17)                  (18) 
The regulator’s beliefs about the nature of the agent are given by a neoadditive 
capacity   based on the prior probability distribution:              , where             and in the following            and       .                                     (19) 
Where  ,   are real numbers such that       and        . The regulator is 
optimistic when     (and when     he is extremely optimistic). Putting it otherwise, he 
gives lesser weight to the probability of revealing the inefficient agent and he is pessimistic 
whenever     (extremely pessimistic with    ). When      , the capacity is additive 
and corresponds to the expected utility function.  Then, the Choquet expected utility of the 
regulator is:                                    (20) 
Or still,                                                                     (20’) 
With a neo-additive capacity, the Choquet utility is the weighted average of the 
minimum, the maximum and the average payoff. For Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2005, 
p. 6): “Intuitively a neo-additive capacity describes a situation in which the individual 
believes the likelihood of events is described by the additive probability measure: However 
(s)he lacks confidence in this belief. In part (s)he reacts to this in an optimistic way measured 
by   and in part the reaction is pessimistic, measured by   .” 
The principal’s program  
For heuristic reasons, the principal’s program writes as: 
                                                                                       (21) 
Under the incentive and participation constraints (9) to (12). 
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Using the following change of variable          and        ) in (15) and 
(16), (Laffont and Martimort(2002)), the program writes now:                                                                                                                                                      (22) 
Under the modified set of constraints:                (23)              (24) 
Under the participation constraints:             (25)             (26) 
In order to solve this program, we note that the number of constraints reduces because 
of the ability of the  -agent to mimic the inefficient one. This involves that the participation 
constraint (25) is always strictly satisfied. Then, (30) is fulfilled and combining it with (23) 
this involves that (25) is always strictly verified. Indeed, when a set of contracts allows an 
inefficient agent to reach his minimum utility level (   ), consequently the efficient agent 
strictly reaches a higher level. The constraint (24) is irrelevant: the inefficient agent cannot 
claim that he is efficient when obviously he is not. Hence, only two constraints are relevant 
(23) and (26) and both are binding. Hence, we get:              (27) 
And,            (28) 
Replacing these values we get a reduced program: 
                                                                                               (29) 
Hence, looking for the first order conditions considering   and   gives:                           (30) 
And, 
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                                            (31) 
Consequently, if     and    , then,                        (31’) 
This last expression corresponds to the solution in which the principal is endowed with 
a Savage expected utility function (SEU-Principal in the following). Rewriting the above 
equation as                       , as Laffont and Mortimort (2002) showed it, in this 
state of nature, increasing the inefficient agent's output by an infinitesimal amount dq raises 
allocative efficiency.  
The SEU-principal's expected payoff improves by a term equal to the left-hand side of 
the equation times dq. Simultaneously, the extremely small change in output also increases 
the information rent of the efficient agent and this diminishes the principal's expected payoff 
by a term equal to the right-hand side above times dq. At this level the expected marginal 
efficiency cost is equal to the expected marginal cost of the rent brought about by an 
infinitesimal change of the inefficient type's output. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between 
rent extraction and efficiency. However, under true uncertainty, when the principal forms 
beliefs about the state of nature, the efficient rent increases at a higher level than expected in 
the standard case. This is the object of proposition 1 : 
Proposition 1: Under asymmetric information between principal and agent, when the 
principal is a Choquet Expected Utility maximizer, the optimal menu of contracts entails: 
 
i) No output distortion for the efficient agent with respect to the first-best,       , as for a SUE-Principal. However, concerning the inefficient type, 
there is an upward distortion,       with                                   where                       , 
and           . This contrary to the SEU case, 
ii) The efficient agent gets a positive information rent corresponding to:                 (32) 
 
iii) The second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for the efficient agent):                     (33) 
 And, for the inefficient one: 
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                 (    
(Proof in appendix 2). 
The similarity of solutions between proposition 1 and the SEU case is only apparent. 
Indeed, both of them issue on no-distortion in production considering the efficient agent who 
supplies the first-best level. Indeed, the i) of proposition 1 shows that       . This result 
was not a priori intuition. However, things change considerably with respect to the inefficient 
agent because the level of production supplied by this agent is higher than under the perfect 
information case:       .  
This situation has consequences on the level of transfers that the principal offers in 
each state of nature. Indeed, considering these transfers (in (33) and (34)), it appears clear that 
they are higher than under complete information,  where from (             , we get                . From (33) we get                which is higher than under the SEU 
case because, under this regime the production supplied by the inefficient agent is below   5. This 
argument establishes proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: Under asymmetric information and true uncertainty, with a Choquet 
Expected Utility maximizer principal, the level of transfers that the principal has to supply is 
higher than when the principal is a SEU maximizer.  
The proof of proposition 2 comes from the above argument. 
Nevertheless, once accepted the methodological change concerning utility functions, 
linking the performances of both schemes is of little interest. Much more attractive is to check 
whether the principal could (should) not reduce the amount of the information rent to pay to 
the efficient agent. In order to answer to this question, we will examine the cases in which the 
principal feels pure or full optimism or pessimism.  
Proposition 3: Under asymmetric information, with a Choquet Expected Utility maximizer 
principal, when the principal feels either fully optimistic       or fully pessimistic      , 
then: 
 
i) The quantity supplied by the less efficient agent is less than under complete 
information.  
 
ii) When fully optimistic, the second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for the 
efficient agent):                       (35) 
 
 And, for the inefficient one: 
                   (    
                                                          
5
 See Laffont and Martimort (2002, chap.2). 
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(Where     and     correspond to the second best solutions when the principal 
feels fully optimistic), 
 
iii) When fully pessimistic, the second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for 
the efficient agent):                       (37) 
And, for the inefficient one: 
                   (    
(Where      and      correspond to the second best solutions when the principal 
feels fully pessimistic). 
(Proof of proposition 3 in appendix 2). 
Proposition 3 establishes that when the principal forms extreme beliefs such as full 
optimism       or full pessimism      , then, as second-best, the production distortion 
will be of the same order than for the situation in which the Principal behaves like a SEU-
Principal. Hence, this production level is lower than the first best level, which corresponds to 
the complete information case:         or       . 
For the principal this situation is highly preferable compared to the case where       and      . Hence, with extreme beliefs, the transfers are lesser than with non 
extreme ones. The difference expresses the principal’s gain if he could switch from moderated 
beliefs to the extreme ones. Consequently from (33) and (34) and from proposition 3 ii) and 
iii), we deduce (for the fully optimistic case) that for the efficient agent:                                                (38) 
 And, for the inefficient one: 
                              (39) 
(The argument is the same for the fully pessimistic case).  
When he must define a contract, the principal with “moderate” beliefs will incur more 
cost transfers compared to the fully optimistic or pessimistic situations. If, however, he could 
change his state of mind and move towards one of these “extreme cases”, then he would 
restrain these costs. This could be done by waiting and/or acquiring more information. Before 
going further we deduce from proposition 3, the proposition 4 that states that: 
Proposition 4 : When    , then                  and          and the reverse 
for       
(Proof of proposition 4 in appendix 2). 
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This proposition means that the ratio of pessimism to optimism is fundamental to 
determine what situation will bring more advantage. This result is important for the following. 
 
IV. THE PRINCIPAL’S CHOICE UNDER IRREVERSIBILITY 
POSSIBILITY 
As a result, the combination of propositions 1 to 3 issues on the theory of irreversible 
choices. Here irreversibility stems from the high transfer costs that the principal can incur if 
he proposes to agents an immediate contract rather than waiting for new information and 
better opportunities. Consequently, with ambiguity theory, the principal has the possibility to 
wait to get further information and then to propose a contract on better conditions at the right 
moment.  
If, after acquiring new information, the principal becomes either fully optimistic or 
pessimistic, that means that he gets better information about the states of nature occurence.  
Then, he is able to minimize the efficient agent’s information rent. The arrival of new 
information changes on a Bayesian basis the probability of states of nature (Epstein (1980). 
This process modifies the value of the neoadditive capacities. Then, the question is whether 
there exists a convergence process from the state of “normal” state of mind (little information) 
towards one of the two extreme states. Studying such a convergence process would deserve a 
full article but going further would require too much space. 
Consequently, a simple illustration is given. It relies on the location choice previously 
developed in the first part of this article. We recall that the principal knows only the 
proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the A area, i.e. respectively   and               this proportion. This ratio will be the prior probability on which he forms 
beliefs.  
Let be   and    respectively the level of optimism and pessimism (       and        ).  Therefore, the principal’s Choquet expected utility is:                                       (40) 
We make the following change variable:     ,          and, naturally,               (41) 
Then,                                           (42) 
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This writing is conforming with Chateauneuf and alii (2007) and it improves the 
understanding of pessimism and optimism which are represented respectively by       and  , where   represents the preference for ambiguity. The higher  , the lesser will be the 
weight of the linear expectation in the principal opinion. Then,       represents the 
aversion for ambiguity parameter. 
We can consider that        is the expected gain for a given initial level of 
information in present time    , let be    this level we rewrite it as          . 
Considering the second best optimum level we get the following level of transfers 
from (33) and (34),                and          . 
Let us assume that the principal has the opportunity of waiting another period (or stage 
2) in order to get new information. By assumption, with it, he can become either fully 
optimistic     or fully pessimistic    . His level of aversion/preference for ambiguity 
can stay identical (fixed  ). At stage 2, the information   will be considered as either positive    if he becomes fully optimistic, or negative    (fully pessimistic). Then with the set of 
initial information   on stage 1, his expected gain is:                                          (43) 
At stage 2 the set of information becomes             and let be      the level of the 
optimism ratio after the coming of new information with:                                  (44) 
Then the expected Choquet utility for stage 1, after the arrival of new information is then:                                                   (45) 
For             
Obviously from proposition 3 ii), for the efficient agent          and          
and, the inefficient one:            and          . As a consequence, without any further 
assumption, the problem would be very simple, because, as we know it from proposition 2 
and 3, here, it is more profitable to wait because in this case, by proposition 3,                    for            . Hence, whatever the relationship between         taking 
into account the change of variable (41), it is better for the principal to wait further 
information.  
However, things change when the information becomes costly. Let        the cost 
of new information, this increases the transfer costs and makes the information waiting 
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process more risky (with         and       ). For instance, by assumption we could 
have a situation in which:                                  (46) 
Where :                                                           (47) 
For            
The problem transforms in a classic problem with irreversibility that can be dealt with 
quasi-option theory. As such, it will not be analyzed here. Indeed, we gave an over-simplified 
model drawn from Fisher and Arrow (1974), Fisher and Peterson (1976) or still Henry (1974) 
and Freeman (1985). The object is to know whether a positive quasi-option may be defined 
from the waiting of new information. Here, this information is supposed costly because we 
gave a sure alternative about the convergence of beliefs about a full optimistic situation or full 
pessimistic situation. In fact, the number of stages could be longer knowing that convergence 
towards these polar situations is not certain. The gathering of information could be organized 
through a Cremer and Khalil (1992) (also Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998)) process where 
the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents, even though 
he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Introducing “true uncertainty” and aversion/preference for ambiguity in the specific 
context of basic agency relationships leads to two kinds of issues. First, as expected, 
ambiguity theory changes somehow the standard results compared to situations that consider 
probability additive utility functions. Hence, regarding the second best solutions, there is no 
production distortion about the quantity supplied by the efficient agent as in the classic case. 
Nevertheless, the level of transfers and the information rent highly increases because the 
transfers due to the inefficient agent are higher than the one supplied under complete 
information. These transfers form the base of the information rent paid to the efficient agent. 
This change in results induces a change in the behavior of the principal and this induces the 
second kind of results.  
Hence, second, when the principal feels “extremely” pessimistic or optimistic 
(respectively, the corresponding degree of optimism (or pessimism) is null) then the results 
are similar to the adverse selection model with a SEU-principal. Consequently, when possible, 
the principal could minimize the level of transfer if, some way, he could feel “extreme” 
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beliefs. This involves that before designing a contract, it could be better to wait for new 
information. Therefore, a principal endowed with a Choquet expected utility has the 
possibility to propose an immediate contract to the agent as in the standard scheme, or to 
await news for a better knowledge about the future states of nature. This knowledge can drive 
him to become either fully optimistic (the probability of finding efficient agents increase) or 
pessimistic in the reverse case. If he decides to offer a delegation contract then, he knows that 
the level of transfer lies inside an acceptable range compared to the complete information 
situation. The postponement of the contract formation will depend upon the cost of 
information, its rate of arrival, the subjective probability of staying at the same level of 
uncertainty, etc.  
As a conclusion, the introduction of ambiguity does not invalidate the relevancy of 
asymmetric information theory. It leads to consider the possibility of irreversible choices and 
writes it in the field of the literature dedicated to the theory of options and quasi-options 
because it becomes obvious that the principal has to take into account the opportunity costs of 
waiting. The above results apply for the simplest model with linear costs; further research will 
extend to situations that are more complicated.    
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Appendix 1 
NEO-CAPACITIES AND AMBIGUITY 
The principal forms beliefs that are represented by neo-additive capacities. Before 
giving an understanding of this concept, it is necessary to define the notion of capacity that 
plays a similar role to subjective probabilities under Savage uncertainty.  
A capacity is an extension of a probability, and as such is a real valued function      
that assigns a real value to the set of events  ,        , where   is the  -algebra of events 
from the finite set of states of nature   (which could be assumed to be infinite too in the 
general case), (with          ).      to be considered as a capacity has to fulfill two 
conditions 
i) For all      , and    , then            as monotonicity condition and, 
 ii) As normalization conditions,        and       . 
Convexity of a capacity is verified by the following relationships: 
                         (and concave in the opposite situation).  
Choquet integrals are used to integrate capacities. To do that is considered a simple 
function   ( where simple means of finite range such that        ,   is  -mesurable) that 
takes values          .  
Hence, Choquet integral of a simple function   with respect to a capacity      is 
defined as:                                                (16) 
The neo-additive capacity is a special kind of capacity and it is called as such because 
it is additive on “non-extreme” outcomes (Neo) as defined by Chateauneuf Grant …( 2007). 
These authors consider that a neo-capacity and its Choquet integral are a particular 
parametrization of the Choquet Expected Utility. “Neo-additive capacities may be viewed as a 
convex combination of an additive capacity and a special capacity that only distinguishes 
between whether an event is impossible, possible or certain” (CEG p.540. 
To build the neo-additive capacity they consider that the set of events   is partitioned 
into three subsets :  
i) The set of null events    where     and for    , and     if    . 
ii) The set of “universal events”  , in which an event is certain to occur, 
(complement of each member of the set ),              
iii) The set of essential events,   , in which events are neither impossible nor 
certain. This set is composed of the following: ,           . 
We can define now the neo-additive capacity: 
Definition  (Chateauneuf and alii (2007) 
A neo additive capacity      is defined as a linear combination of  
i) An additive belief     , that corresponds to a finite additive probability where        if     and        if    , 
ii) A non-additive belief    where          if     and 1 otherwise,  
iii) A non-additive belief    where          if     and 0 otherwise,  
 Then, for     and     such that      , a neo-capacity writes as:                                  
This for all    . 
Then, we can define the Choquet integral of a neo-capacity as a weighted sum of the 
minimum, the maximum and the expectation of a simple function         such that              if                 and for                     and a 
similar argument is developed  for             if                 and for                    . Hence, we draw the  following relationship: 
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                                            (.) 
Where       is the expected value of the welfare function taking into account the type 
of agents, and from the linearity of the Choquet integral with respect to the capacity,                     and                    , (proof see CFG(2002, 3). 
From the definition of the Choquet integral, we can derive the following results: 
i) If      , then                 (the expected utility), 
ii)    , then                              (pure pessimism),  
iii)     , then                             (pure optimism),  
iv)      ,                             (Hurwitz criteria).  
All that means that the Choquet integral of a neo-additive utility may be represented as 
a weighted average of the expected utility, the maximum utility and the minimum one. That 
means that neo-additive capacities allow to take into consideration situatios in which the 
probability of events is described by the additive probability distribution     , however the 
agent lacks confidence in this belief and he may feel either  optimistic, (measured by  ), or 
pessimistic (measured by  ). 
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Appendix 2: 
 PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS 
Proposition 1: Under asymmetric information between principal and agent, when the 
principal is a Choquet Expected Utility maximizer, the optimal menu of contracts entails: 
 
i) No output distortion for the efficient agent with respect to the first-best,       , as for a SUE-Principal. However, concerning the inefficient type, 
there is an upward distortion,       with                                   where                       , 
and           . This Contrary to the SEU case, 
ii) The efficient agent gets a positive information rent corresponding to:                 (A2.1) 
 
iii) The second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for the efficient agent):                     (A2.2) 
 And, for the inefficient one: 
                 (      
 
Proof: 
This proof requires several steps: 
Proof of i) 
- Concerning the efficient agent, considering          , we verify immediately that                  then       . 
- Concerning the inefficient type, from,                                 we 
can verify that that:                                    . 
 To show this point, let us assume that:                           . Developing this 
expression, recalling that:        , we get:                   or still,            .  
Let us notice that             because         then           . However,   is a 
probability and         and the above relationship is impossible. Then,                                     
 That means, because by assumption that       is a decreasing function (         , that               , then       . 
- It remains to show that         
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We apply the same argument than previously and we examine the conditions for 
which here                                    
Developing this expression, recalling that:        , leads to study:                            , or,                      
As the numerator is always positive, we have to study the conditions for a negative 
denominator:                  . Putting it otherwise, the condition becomes:                  
Obviously this cannot hold, because                 that involves that                   
This is contradictory with the fact that   is a probability then,                   
 
That means that          , and consequently,         , QED. 
Proofs of ii) and iii): 
 Calculus are made on the definition of information rents and the level of constraints in 
a similar mode achieved by Laffont Martimort (2002) chap.2 section 2.  
Proposition 3: Under asymmetric information, with a Choquet Expected Utility maximizer 
principal, when the principal feels either fully optimistic       or fully pessimistic      , 
then: 
 
i) The quantity supplied by the less efficient agent is less than under complete 
information.  
 
ii) When fully optimistic, the second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for the 
efficient agent):                       (B 2.1) 
 
 And, for the inefficient one: 
                   (B 2.2) 
 
(Where     and     correspond to the second best solutions when the principal 
feels fully optimistic), 
 
iii) When fully pessimistic, the second-best transfers corresponds respectively to( for 
the efficient agent):                       (B 2.3) 
And, for the inefficient one: 
                   (B 2.4) 
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(Where      and      correspond to the second best solutions when the principal 
feels fully pessimistic). 
Proof of proposition 3: 
Concerning point i) we proceed in two steps. The first one analyzes the situation in 
which the principal feels fully or purely optimistic and the second one in which he is 
pessimistic.  
a) Pure optimism 
A Principal purely optimistic means that     (then, because          can take 
values between 0 and 1). We keep the same program, constraints and simplification over 
constraints as before and we get:                                                                            
Looking for second best solutions under the assumption of a pure optimistic principal 
leads to the following results. Hence, the first order conditions considering   and   give:                      
And,                                           . 
Where     and     correspond to the second best solutions when the principal feels 
fully optimistic. Naturally concerning the efficient agent we can see that, as in the general 
case there is no distortion in production and         , and as a consequence,         
We can check immediately that,                   and        and, as a consequence        because                          . The first term of the proposition 3 is 
proved. This result means that under ambiguity and pure optimism the level of informational 
distortion considering the inefficient agent is higher than under the lack of ambiguity of the 
standard result. The above relationship means that when the principal feels fully optimistic, he 
expects that the inefficient agent is more inefficient than under SEU.  
b) Pure pessimism 
We proceed alike as above and we consider that the principal is now absolutely pessimistic       .The objective function becomes then:                                                                          
Looking for second best solutions under the assumption of a pure optimistic principal 
leads to the following results. The first order conditions considering   and   give: 
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And ,                                         
Where      and      correspond to the second best solutions when the principal feels fully 
pessimistic. As previously and the general case, concerning the efficient agent there is no 
distorsion in production and           , and as a consequence,          However, 
concerning the inefficient agent, distorsion exists and we have to check if                    . It 
appears immediately that naturally,           , then then to verify the relationships, we 
must have            . Let us assume that            . That means that           which is a contradiction because       and       . Hence,                     and, consequently                  and        . The second term of the proposition is then proved. 
ii) Concerning  the proof of ii) and iii) we proceed in a similar way as for 
point iii) of proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 4 : When    , then                  and          and the reverse 
for       
Proof in appendix 2: 
Let us assume that                  or                                            
After simplification we get:         
This is true for    . When,     , then                  QED. 
 
 
